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 This study assesses the geographic concentration of venture capital (VC) 
investments. Using Crunchbase’s data from 1998 to 2019, the research finds that top-VCs 
investments lead to more local successful exits and at higher valuations. Successful 
entrepreneurs’ investments do not necessarily increase local exits, but they lead to higher 
exit valuations. It is not possible to infer that successful US exits will persistently signal 
top and non-top VCs to invest in local hubs, but the effects seem to be significant in the 
year of the exit. Investments from successful entrepreneurs are not relevant drivers for 
the increase of VC deals. 
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Section 1 - Introduction 
Young and promising companies face uncertain prospects, with long periods of 
negative cash flows, and hold mainly intangible assets, which increases asymmetric 
information. Thus, venture capitalists (VCs) are oftentimes their only possible source of 
financing (Gompers & Lerner, 1998). VCs also add value to their portfolio firms by 
improving their strategy, getting access to clients and suppliers, recruit talent, among 
other vital monitoring activities to a successful exit (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). 
Venture Capital is praised by local governments and civil society because it spurs 
innovation. For example, it accounted for 8% to 14% of the U.S. innovative activity 
between 1992 to 1998 (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). Consequently, VC activity is also 
associated with stronger economic growth (Kolmakov et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
successful companies, like Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Facebook were VC-backed 
in earlier stages (AngelList, 2019). Hence, cities worldwide want to stimulate 
entrepreneurship and VC activity to create their own Silicon Valley.  
The US was the pioneer of Venture Capital. The first modern VC firm, American 
Research and Development Corporation, was founded in 1946 in Boston. This early 
adoption of VC and the vigorous high-tech sector in Silicon Valley concentrated the VC 
sector in the US (Lerner, 2009), especially in three hubs: San Francisco Bay Area, New 
York, and Boston (Chen et al., 2010).  In fact, until the mid-1990s, almost the entire global 
VC investments were focused in the US. However, entrepreneurial hubs are proliferating 
worldwide, particularly in Asia (ex. Beijing, Shanghai, Bangalore, Delhi, Singapore) and 
Europe (ex. Paris, London, Berlin, Stockholm). Still, the US concentrated half of the 
global VC market in 2017 (Florida & Hathaway, 2018). 
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Although many global entrepreneurial hubs are growing fast, some of their best-
performing ventures are relocating abroad, mainly to the US. Those firms seek to attract 
later-stage financing, exit through IPO, secure superior resources, reach a larger customer 
base, access to learning opportunities or to operate in a more corporate-friendly legal 
environment (Cumming et al., 2009). For instance, 14% of fast-growing European high-
tech startups have moved their headquarters abroad. Most of those firms (83%) relocated 
to the US, especially to Silicon Valley and New York (Onetti & Glazer, 2017). 
Hence, it is important to understand if these emerging hubs can achieve and 
sustain enough scale to overcome the concentration of the three leading US hubs. Will 
they be able to avoid the relocation of their most promising ventures? Can they fund larger 
late-stage rounds and secure larger exit valuations? 
The thesis will focus on answering these questions. The rest of the research is 
organized in the following way. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature about venture 
capitalists’ decision process, the geographic concentration of VC investments and venture 
relocation. In section 3 is discussed the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 5 examines the empirical findings. Whereas, in section 6 is 
presented the conclusion, main implications and potential limitations of this study.  
Section 2 - Literature review 
There is already extensive literature about the geographic concentration of venture 
capital and the decision-making process of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. 
However, there are not many studies regarding young ventures’ relocation and the 
development of local entrepreneurial ecosystems. Thus, it is important to complement the 
existing literature to better understand the reasons for ventures’ relocation and local 




Kerr et al. (2014) state that VC is an industry-driven by hits: 55% of VC-backed 
firms terminate at a loss, while 6% of them represent 50% of the industry’s gross returns. 
Due to this uncertainty, VCs implement an experimentation process to assess a project’s 
commercial feasibility without investing the full amount at once. After VCs identify hit 
companies, they invest larger amounts to scale them up.  
Chen et al. (2010) note there is a larger availability of funding in Silicon Valley, 
Boston, and New York due to performance persistence. On one hand, VCs want to be in 
areas that offer the highest concentration of profitable investments. Hence, they locate in 
regions that have been historically performing better. On the other hand, founders choose 
to locate their businesses closer to funding sources, talented human resources, and 
research centers. Consequently, more entrepreneurs move to the leading hubs, which 
brings more good opportunities for VCs that invest more in those hubs. Therefore, both 
VCs and VC-backed firms based on the three leading US hubs outperform their peers.  
Geographic Concentration 
Venture Capitalists tend to demonstrate a “strong local bias in their investment 
decisions” (Cumming & Dai, 2010). Thus, the further a potential target is from a VC, the 
lower the odds of securing funding (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Prijcker et al. (2019) 
concluded that ventures that relocate to California or Massachusetts have a greater 
probability of attracting initial VC investment than firms that stay in their home state.  
Typically, VCs concentrate their investments in a specific hub to monitor better 
their portfolio companies in a cost-efficient way, as they can visit on-site several firms 
with reduced transportation and monitoring costs (Chen et al., 2010). Moreover, if 
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portfolio companies were geographically dispersed, VCs would have less time available 
for each of them (Knill, 2009).  
Furthermore, investing abroad translates into more information asymmetries due 
to cultural and legal differences between the VC’s and target’s countries (Kolympiris et 
al., 2018). Consequently, VCs tend to demand higher standards for their overseas targets, 
in terms of business experience or patent applications (Kolympiris et al., 2018). Hence, 
around 50% of VC firms just focus in a specific region (Gompers et al., 2018), and most 
international VCs invest in countries institutionally similar to their own (Vedula & 
Matusik, 2017). Nevertheless, once VCs invested in a venture of a specific country, there 
is a higher chance they will fund other firms of that hub (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).   
However, VCs tend to follow their peers regarding international investments 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Vedula & Matusik, 2017). If a syndicate partner invests in an 
overseas venture, VCs are more likely to co-invest because they trust their peers’ 
judgment. Therefore, VC firms tend to use their syndicate partners to “identify, screen, 
and monitor potential investments in distant locations” (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). 
Nevertheless, if there are more good investment opportunities in their local markets, VCs 
tend to seize those deals, instead of investing abroad (Vedula & Matusik, 2017).  
Medcalfe and Thompson (2017), and Ballinger et al. (2016) argue that the 
concentration of VC investments in the US follows a long-run upward trend. Hence, 
efforts to attract VC investments for other hubs may just result in temporary gains, as any 
shock is only transitory. Tough these findings could be accurate for the United States, 
they are not necessarily valid globally. Recent data indicates that other overseas hubs are 
gaining ground. For example, Beijing was responsible for 20% of global VC investment 
growth between 2015-2017, whereas San Francisco was responsible for 16% (Florida & 
Hathaway, 2018).  
6 
 
Experienced top-VCs  
Successful VCs (measured by the number of IPOs) and with more active funds 
make more international investments (Vedula & Matusik, 2017). Lerner (2009) argues 
that global investors are vital to a dynamic entrepreneurial hub because they bring more 
capital, sophistication, experience, and scale. Therefore, they provide superior value-
added monitoring and networking ties for their portfolio firms. As a result, their investee 
firms tend to raise more funding and have more successful exits than startups that only 
receive local VC funding (Espenlaub et al., 2015; Kong et al., 2016).  Besides, if a hub 
has predominantly local VCs with small funds, there will be constraints to finance firms 
in later stages. Consequently, ventures relocate to other hubs with larger availability of 
capital (Gompers & Lerner, 1998; Cumming et al., 2009; Kong et al., 2016).  
Nevertheless, Devigne et al. (2013) claim that the most successful VC-backed 
firms in terms of growth are the ones that are initially funded by a syndicate of domestic 
and cross-border VCs. On one side, domestic VCs have greater local knowledge, which 
enables them to overcome information asymmetries and provide early-stage support. On 
the other side, cross-border VCs have a better understanding of external markets and add 
legitimacy to the venture.  
Social Capital and Native Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs tend to locate in regions where they have lived longer because of 
their “home-field advantage” and greater social capital (Figueiredo et al., 2002; Dahl & 
Sorenson, 2012). However, these studies focused only on Portuguese and Danish firms 
from all sectors. Hence, their findings might neither apply to other regions, neither to fast-
growing sectors that are the main receivers of VC funding.  
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Feldman (2014) advocates that social capital is the driver for the success of Silicon 
Valley. In her view, it is the cornerstone for the establishment of new technologies and 
hubs’ development. Therefore, ecosystems’ success is propelled by regional champions 
– individuals with social responsibility who, even though they are seeking for profit, want 
to improve their communities. Moreover, one of the appointed factors for the success of 
Silicon Valley was the role of local wealthy angel investors in financing infant ventures 
(Lerner, 2009).  
Furthermore, the development of local entrepreneurial ecosystems is being 
accelerated by highly skilled expatriates that work in high-technology firms and VC 
industries worldwide. Those individuals are acting as angel investors, mentors, and 
partners in their native countries (Lerner, 2009; Saxenian, 2002). For instance, 22% of 
Indian-born entrepreneurs working in Silicon Valley invested in Indian Startups 
(Saxenian, 2002).  
Section 3 - Theoretical Conclusions and Hypotheses 
Emerging hubs that have been the home of successful startups, due to performance 
persistence, get more attention from VCs, entrepreneurs, and talented human resources. 
VC firms start considering that these hubs have a large concentration of profitable 
opportunities. Moreover, as the management team is considered by VCs as the decisive 
factor for a venture’s success (Gompers et al., 2018), they tend to invest where there are 
entrepreneurs with a good reputation. Therefore, the following hypotheses are drawn: 
H1a: Hubs that were the original location of successful ventures will draw more 
VC investment 
H1b: Hubs that were the original location of successful ventures will draw more 
investment from top-VCs 
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Top-VCs provide better value-added monitoring support to their portfolio 
companies and have more successful exits. Therefore, if they invest directly in ventures’ 
home hubs, they do not need to relocate in late stages due to capital constraints. As such, 
this hypothesis is presented: 
H2: VC investments from top-VCs enhances local exits 
Successful entrepreneurs with “social capital” use their experience as founders to 
help other fellow countrymen in their start-ups, while also profiting from it. Furthermore, 
they will use their “home-field advantage” to overcome information asymmetries, that 
other VC would not be able to. Thus, the following hypotheses are presented: 
H3a: Investments led by native successful entrepreneurs will signal VC firms to 
invest in their home hubs 
H3b: Investments led by native successful entrepreneurs will signal top-VC firms 
to invest in their home hubs 
Successful entrepreneurs have greater knowledge in founding and managing a 
start-up from inception until exit. This experience could increase the odds of the success 
of their portfolio ventures. Hence, this hypothesis is drawn: 
H4: VC Investments from native successful entrepreneurs enhances local exits  
Section 4 – Data and Methodology  
 The data used in this study was extracted from Crunchbase’s research access 
database. In terms of ventures analyzed, the following sampling criteria were applied: it 
was only considered firms that received VC investment from 1946 onwards; firms 
missing information about their location, founding date or funding size were excluded; 
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and ventures that failed (did not exit and closed) were also excluded. After these 
adjustments, the dataset englobed 93,287 ventures from 157 countries. 
 For the exits’ analysis, it was only considered successful exits – exits through IPO 
or M&A higher than $50 million, adjusted for the 2018 US Consumer Price Index (source: 
Bureau of Labor Statistics). The resulting sub-sample consists of 3,679 VC-backed firms 
whose exit occurred between 1980 and 2018. Non-US ventures whose IPO was in a US 
stock exchange or that were acquired by American corporations were labeled as US-exits. 
Ventures whose IPO occurred in their country or were acquired by native companies were 
categorized as local exits. All other ventures were classified as foreign-exits. To 
guarantee robust results, it was only studied countries that had more than 8 US-Exits 
between 1998 and 2018. Thus, 12 countries were evaluated: Australia, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.  
 Regarding VC deals analysis, it was considered local VC deals and local top-
VCs deals. Top-VCs were defined as VCs with at least 10 successful exits. Following 
this criterion, there are 66 top-VCs (Sequoia Capital, Benchmark, Accel, Bessemer, etc.) 
out of 1,661 VC firms. In aggregate, the sampled ventures had 190,910 funding rounds, 
of which 6,115 had top-VCs as lead investors.  
 There are 62 successful entrepreneurs-investors: co-founders or c-level 
executives of ventures with successful exits that are also VC investors. Overall, they 
participated in 782 VC-funding rounds. In the database used, France, Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland had not successful entrepreneurs investing locally. Hence, it 
was not possible to analyze these countries for hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 4.   
 In table 1 is presented the summary of the main descriptive statistics of the 12 




 To test the hypotheses, there were performed two event studies for each of them, 
with the aggregate values of the twelve assessed countries, to have a more precise and 
global understanding of the results. The first event study reflects a thinner time period 
(quarter by quarter) to evaluate if a certain variable has a direct and immediate effect on 
another one. Whereas, similar to other recent researches (Smith et al., 2019), the second 
event study analyses a longer time period (year by year).  
 In this way, it is possible to appraise if there is a significant relationship between 
the variables and if it is relevant. In other words, this analysis aims to infer if there is a 
significant change in the dependent variable’s trend after the event (exit or VC deal), or 
if it keeps the same trend as before. Moreover, it allows testing the effects’ persistence by 
looking at the results in the subsequent years of the event. To compute the event studies 
the following equation was followed: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝑥𝑡+𝑘 + 𝜀 
𝑘 ∈ {−3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2,3}  
with t representing the year/quarter of the event and 𝜀 the error, which was assumed to follow a normal distribution 
Table 2 identifies the independent and dependent variables considered for the 
analysis of each hypothesis.  
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
AUS CAN CHE CHN DEU FRA GBR IND IRL ISR NLD SWE Total
Number of Ventures 1,406 3,168 905 4,256 1,859 2,873 7,525 3,310 742 1,655 969 1,109 29,777
Local VC deals 2,518 6,412 1,938 7,734 3,620 5,079 15,460 5,894 1,428 3,360 1,755 2,397 57,595
Average number of Local VC deals per year 89.9 229.0 69.2 276.2 129.3 181.4 552.1 210.5 51.0 120.0 62.7 85.6 2,057
Median number of Local VC deals per year 17 94 20 81 55 90 186 35 20 61 10 25 711
Average VC deal size ($M) 10.8 11.5 13.1 68.1 22.2 9.1 10.2 21.4 17.2 8.6 10.2 8.3 20.1
Average rounds of financing 1.8 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.2 1.9
Top-VC deals 26 110 24 385 87 61 206 299 9 131 23 29 1,390
Average number of Top-VC deals per year 1.04 4.4 0.96 15.4 3.48 2.44 8.24 11.96 0.36 5.24 0.92 1.16 55.6
Median number of Top-VC deals per year 0 2 1 3 2 2 6 7 0 5 1 0 31
Average Top-VC deal size ($M) 81.4 32.6 68.0 139.9 44.9 46.6 40.1 59.2 11.1 16.6 41.3 36.8 70.7
Successful entrepreneurs 6 5 0 13 4 0 23 17 1 6 0 0 75
Average number of Investments per year 0.3 0.25 0 0.65 0.2 0 1.15 0.85 0.05 0.3 0 0 3.75
Median number of Investments per year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 1
Average Investment deal size ($M) 2.4 21.9 0 253.5 7.6 0 15.3 4.3 5.5 8.4 0 0 52.4
Number of Successful US-exits 17 40 17 107 22 20 84 8 17 66 15 12 425
Average number of US-exits per year 0.8 1.9 0.8 5.1 1.0 1.0 4.0 0.4 0.8 3.1 0.7 0.6 20.2
Median number of US-exits per year 0 1 0 3 0 1 3 0 1 2 0 0 15
Average US-exit size ($M) 847 337 2,120 4,335 306 356 621 2,310 2,327 887 2,225 4,846 1,887
Median US-exit size ($M) 259 307 255 819 284 156 321 274 769 440 1,307 2,751 761
Number of Sucessful Local-exits 13 21 6 47 18 24 77 29 4 17 6 5 267
Average number of Local-exits per year 0.6 1.0 0.3 2.2 0.9 1.1 3.7 1.4 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.2 12.7
Median number of Local-exits per year 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 5
Average Local-exit size ($M) 748 407 506 4,635 1,877 341 434 703 1,184 449 924 336 1,328




Section 5 – Empirical results 
 In this section are presented the research’s findings that allow to validate or reject 
the hypotheses drawn. Appendixes A, B, C, and D have a summary of the results 
(regression coefficients, P-Values, and R-squared) of the tests executed to analyzed 
hypotheses H1 (a and b), H2, H3 (a and b), and H4, respectively.  
US-exits and VC deals 
 As discussed in hypotheses 1a and 1b, in aggregate terms, hubs that were the 
original location of ventures with successful US-exits draw more VC investments from 
top and non-top VCs in the following years. Although the results are statistically 
significant (for a 95% confidence level) for both event studies, it is not possible to infer 
that the exits are the driver of hubs’ growth, since the increasing trend is also observed in 
the periods before the exit moment (Graphs 1 to 4).  
 Nevertheless, for hypothesis 1a is observed that successful US exits might have a 
positive impact on local VC deals in the exit year. In the two years before, the aggregate 
VC sector was presenting an annual growth rate between 18.2% and 18.7%. Whereas in 
the year of the exit, local VC deals grow on average 21.5%. Thus, this 3% differential 
seems to be related by the positive signal effect that successful US exits have over VCs. 
Moreover, the exit year presents the most significant relationship between the two 
variables as it generated an R-squared (R2) of 0.80, the largest of the seven periods 
Table 2 - Variables 
Hypothesis Dependent Variables Independent Variables
H1a Local VC Deals Successful US-Exits
H1b Top-VC Deals Successful US-Exits
H2 Local Successful Exits Top-VC Deals
H3a Local VC Deals Successful entrpreneurs-investors
H3b Top-VC Deals Successful entrpreneurs-investors
H4 Local Successful Exits Successful entrpreneurs-investors
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assessed (Appendix A – Table 4). This means that 80% of the variation in the number of 
local VC deals are explained by changes in the number of successful US-exits in that 
year. Hence, these results suggest that VCs infer that the original hub of a successful 
venture might have other good investing opportunities. Consequently, they increase their 
investments in that market, as it is proposed in the performance persistence theory (Chen 
et al., 2010).  
 These results could also suggest that VCs make late-stage investments some 
months before an exit. However, the thinner event study reveals that there are more VC 
deals in the subsequent quarters of an exit than in the previous ones. Therefore, this theory 
appears not to be valid. 
 
 For hypothesis 1b is also observed that, in aggregate terms, hubs with successful 
US exits draw more investments from top-VCs, in the exit year. In the previous year, VC 
deals’ annual growth rate is 22.9%, whereas in the next year it is 28.7%. Even though 
these results are not persistent for the 2 next years (coefficients equal to 3.2 and 3.16, 
respectively), they seem to be relevant again for 3 years after the exit, as top-VCs spur 
their investments (coefficient equal to 3.64). This might occur because top-VCs let their 
syndicate partners invest in early-stage rounds. Therefore, they face the experimentation 
period on their behalf, and top-VCs only invest in later-stages rounds, as defended by 




 Hence, the results seem to partly reinforce the performance persistence theory 
proposed by Chen et al. (2010), as hubs with successful US exits tend to draw more VC 
investments in the exit year. Furthermore, in aggregate terms, the twelve VC sectors 
analyzed have consistently presented a growing trend. Therefore, as referred before, the 
results of Medcalfe and Thompson (2017), and Ballinger et al. (2016), defending that the 
concentration of VC investments in the US follows a long-run upward trend, seem not to 
be valid for the global VC market. 
 However, as previously stated, the growing trend on VC deals seems to be related 
to other factors besides successful US-exits. Hence, the results are not strong enough to 
comfortably accept hypotheses 1a and 1b.  
Top-VC deals and Local successful exits 
 As defended in hypothesis 2, investments from top-VCs enhance local exits. The 
event study for a narrower time period reveals a positive relationship between the number 
of investments from top-VCs and the number of successful local exits (Appendix B – 
Table 7). The results are statistically significant for a 95% confidence level, but the 
number of exits does not change meaningfully between the quarters before and after the 
exit (graph 5). However, these findings are not surprising as most exits occur in a longer 
period than three quarters after the investment. Even so, it is possible to verify an increase 
in local exits three quarters after the investment. The coefficient for that period is equal 
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to 0.26, which means that for every 100 top-VC deals, there would be, on average, 26 
local successful exits after three quarters. This might reveal that some top-VCs invest in 
“hit companies” in the late-stage round, where typically ventures have larger funding 
needs that only top-VCs can provide (Lerner, 2009).  
 
 It is also observed a positive and significant relationship between the number of 
investments from top-VCs and the number of successful local exits, for a lengthier time 
period (Appendix B – Table 8). Although the growing trend is also noted before the exit 
moment, top-VCs seem to have a significant role in the number of local exits (graph 6). 
Before the investment and in the subsequent year, the annual growth rate varies around 
2.6% to 3.9%, whereas two and three years after the investment, the annual growth rate 
is 6.7% and 6.3%, respectively. Additionally, the results are equally relevant for the 
different time periods, since R2 is equal to 0.90, 0.95, 0.87, and 0.90 for the year of the 
investment until three years after, respectively.  
 The findings also reveal that top-VCs investments lead to higher exit valuations. 
They are significant for a 95% confidence level, and the effects persist and grow over 
time. Prior to the top-VCs’ investments, per each aggregate dollar invested there would 
be an average gross return of $1.17, while the average return is $4.68, $8.27, $10.09, and 
$13.64, in the investment year and the following years, respectively (Graph 7). However, 
the effects lose some significance in the subsequent periods of the investment, as R2 is 
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equal to 0.88, 0.86, 0.52, and 0.72 for the investment year until three years after, 
respectively (Appendix B – Table 9). 
Hence, these results reinforce the literature (Lerner, 2009; Espenlaub et al., 2015; 
Kong et al., 2016): top-VCs are vital to a dynamic entrepreneurial hub, as their portfolio 
companies tend to have more exits and at a higher valuation. They are consistent with the 
findings of Kolympiris et al. (2018), as well. Top-VCs seem to demand higher standards 
for their foreign targets to mitigate information asymmetries, as their returns grow much 
faster than the number of investments. Therefore, they are more selective in their overseas 
investments and only fund ventures that have better prospects of being “hit companies”. 
Lastly, since ventures tend to relocate to hubs with larger availability of capital (Gompers 
& Lerner, 1998; Cumming et al., 2009; Kong et al., 2016), the higher number of local 
successful exits and at higher valuations might reduce the need to ventures to relocate to 
the US.  
Therefore, it is not possible to reject hypothesis 2. Top-VCs seem to be important 
players to enhance local VC markets, as their investments lead to more exits and at higher 
valuations. Moreover, they also have an important role in retaining successful firms.
 
Successful entrepreneurs and VC deals 
 There is a positive and significant relationship (for a 95% confidence level) 
between the number of investments led by native successful entrepreneurs and the number 
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of VC deals, both from top and non-top VC firms. However, it is not possible to conclude 
that they will have a relevant signal effect over VC firms to invest in their countries, as it 
was expected in hypothesis 3a. Both for the thinner and lengthier event studies, it possible 
to infer that during the periods after the investment led by a successful entrepreneur, the 
number of VC deals does not change significantly compared to the moments before that 
investment (graphs 8 and 9).  
Nevertheless, the effects in the following years to the investments are less 
significant than in the preceding periods (Appendix C – Table 11). R2 is equal to 0.91, 
0.94, 0.97, 0.96, 0.79, 073, and 0.56 for the three years before the investment until three 
years after, respectively. This might occur because few successful entrepreneurs invested 
in startups in the analyzed hubs during the assessed period. Besides, their investments 
only started to be more consistent after 2010. Although currently hypothesis 3a must be 
rejected, when more reliable data is available, it might be possible to conduct more 
significant analysis. 
 
 It is not also possible to confirm hypothesis 3b, even though there is a positive 
and significant relationship between the number of investments led by successful 
entrepreneurs and the number of top-VC deals. It is inferred that top-VC deals increase 
in the preceding and subsequent periods of the investment led by successful 
entrepreneurs, for both event studies (graphs 10 and 11).  
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Nevertheless, in the same quarter of the exit is observed a substantial increase in 
top-VC deals (6.46 deals per each investment) comparing to the previous quarter (5.84 
deals). This might reveal, as it is proposed by Sorenson & Stuart (2001) and Vedula & 
Matusik (2017), that VCs trust their peers’ judgment regarding international investments, 
and they co-invest with them. Hence, they believe that successful entrepreneurs have 
enough business experience and local market knowledge to help other entrepreneurs to 
achieve a successful exit. Consequently, top-VCs consider that these target firms will 
comply with the high standards they demand (Kolympiris et al., 2018), which reduces 
information asymmetries. 
 
Successful entrepreneurs and Local Successful exits 
 Similar to hypothesis 2, it is observed a positive and significant (for a 95% 
confidence level) relationship between the number of investments led by successful 
native entrepreneurs and the number of local exits in the thinner event study. Nonetheless, 
the number of exits does not change significantly between the preceding and subsequent 
periods of the investment (graph 12).  
However, it is noticeable that in the quarter before the investments there are a 
larger number of local exits (coefficient equal to 1.42). Thus, in the short run, it seems 
that local exits signal native successful entrepreneurs to invest in local ventures due to the 
performance persistence effect defended by Chen, et al. (2010). Nevertheless, the effects 
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lose some significance comparing to the results of the quarter prior to the investments, 
whose R2 is equal to 0.49 (Appendix D – Table 14).  
 
 Regarding the lengthier time period, it also verified a positive and significant 
relationship between the number of investments led by successful entrepreneurs and the 
number of local exits. Nevertheless, it is visible that the number of local exits presents an 
increasing trend both before and after the period of the investment (graph 13). Therefore, 
it is not possible to conclude that native successful entrepreneurs are the main reason for 
the increase in the number of local exits.  
 On the other hand, the findings suggest, for a 95% confidence level, that 
investments led by successful entrepreneurs result in larger exit valuations (graph 14). 
Without successful entrepreneurs’ investment and value-added monitoring, per each 
potential aggregate dollar invested there would be an average gross return within $14.26 
and $29.18 range. Whereas, in between the investment year and the three following years, 
per each dollar invested by a successful entrepreneur the entire local VC market would 
have a gross return between $60.42 and $100.32. Therefore, this is a sign that firms that 
receive funding from successful entrepreneurs tend to present bigger exit valuations, as it 
is defended in hypothesis 4.  
  These results are consistent with the literature. As Devigne et al. (2013) suggest 
the most successful VC-backed firms are the ones that are initially funded by domestic 
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VCs, in this case, domestic angel investors. Native investors have greater local knowledge 
and can properly overcome information asymmetries. Furthermore, these findings appear 
to support Saxenian's (2002) views: successful expatriated entrepreneurs are improving 
their native entrepreneurial hubs by acting as angel investors, mentors, and partners. 
Therefore, as Lerner (2009) advocates, local angel investors that finance young ventures 
are one key driver to the success of local entrepreneurial ecosystems as they have the 
“social capital” defended by Feldman (2014): they want to improve their communities, 
but also profiting from it. 
Although investments from successful entrepreneurs do not necessarily lead to 
more exits, they lead to higher exit valuations. Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis 4, it 
seems that investments from successful entrepreneurs enhance local exits. Nevertheless, 
the results might present some multicollinearity issues, as there is a positive correlation 
between the number of investments led by successful entrepreneurs and the number of 
top-VC deals, which in turn are positively correlated with local exits’ valuation.  
 
Section 6 – Conclusions and Limitations 
 Although the results indicate a positive correlation, for a 95% confidence level, 
between the number of successful US-exits and the number of top and non-top VC deals, 
for both event studies, it is not possible to infer that those exits are the driver for the VC 
sector development. The event studies demonstrate that VC deals were already increasing 
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independently of the number of US exits. Literature suggests other factors for VC sector 
growth: hubs’ market size (Cumming et al., 2009; Florida & King, 2016; Weterings & 
Knoben, 2013), existence of high-quality research facilities (Lerner, 2009), quality of 
legal systems (Gompers & Lerner, 1998; Espenlaub et al., 2015), among others. Hence, 
further research could focus on complementing those studies and assess if those factors 
can indeed decrease venture relocations.  
 However, the findings are consistent with the performance persistence theory 
(Chen et al., 2010). In the year of a successful exit, there is a boost in investments from 
top and non-top VCs. Moreover, top-VCs tend to increase their investments three years 
after a successful US-exit, which might reveal that they let their syndicate partners face 
the experimentation period on their behalf and only invest in later-stages rounds, as 
defended by Sorenson and Stuart (2001) and Devigne et al. (2013).  
 The results also suggest that top-VCs are vital to the development of local VC 
markets. Their investments lead to more local successful exits and at a higher valuation. 
Thus, the existence of larger funding capacity and the ability to exit successfully in local 
hubs can partly avoid young venture relocation. Consequently, it could be a sign that VC 
hubs can overcome the dominance of the three main US hubs.  
 It was not possible to infer that investments from successful entrepreneurs signal 
top and non-top VCs to invest in their native hubs, even though these variables presented 
a positive and significant (for a 95% confidence level) correlation. Neither it was possible 
to conclude that investments from successful entrepreneurs lead to more local successful 
exits. Nevertheless, their portfolio firms tend to exit locally at higher valuations. 
Therefore, it seems that investments from successful entrepreneurs enhance local exits. 
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 Thus, the main implication of this research is that top-VCs are key players for 
local hubs to gain relevance over the US, as they tend to assure more successful exits at 
higher valuations. As such, future studies could focus on other factors that attract top-
VCs to a specific hub.   
This master thesis has some limitations. Firstly, some entries on Crunchbase’s 
database were incomplete. Therefore, they had to be excluded, even though they could 
potentially have been useful observations. Secondly, there is only data for US-exits from 
1998 onwards. Besides, for most years, many hubs had zero US-exits. Thus, only after 
2008, there is enough data to achieve robust results. Thirdly, there are great annual 
variations regarding VC deals and exits. Hence, this could compromise the results’ 
robustness, as the variables could not present a linear relationship between them, and the 
errors could not be normally distributed. Fourthly, the definitions of successful exit and 
top-VC are assumptions made by the author. Thus, other definitions of these variables 
could lead to completely different results. Lastly, the analyses were conducted over the 
aggregate values of the twelve assessed countries. Therefore, the conclusions of this study 
might not apply for some, or even all, the hubs considered. However, this method 
mitigates some of the other identified limitations, like the lack of data in some years 


















Table 3 - Thinner Event study: US exits and VC deals
-3Q -2Q -1Q 0Q 1Q 2Q 3Q
Coefficient 98.4 103.2 109.2 112.9 116.7 116.1 115.9
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.61
n=84
Table 4 - Lengthier Event study: US exits and VC deals
-3Y -2Y -1Y 0Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Coefficient 86.5 102.7 121.4 147.4 141.1 154.5 169.9
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.80 0.73 0.70 0.73
n=21
Table 5 - Thinner Event study: US exits and Top-VC deals
-3Q -2Q -1Q 0Q 1Q 2Q 3Q
Coefficient 2.01 2.12 2.27 2.37 2.52 2.74 2.71
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.54 0.53 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.68 0.65
n=84
Table 6 - Lengthier Event study: US exits and Top-VC deals
-3Y -2Y -1Y 0Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Coefficient 2.00 1.93 2.38 3.06 3.20 3.16 3.64
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.79 0.66 0.69 0.81 0.82 0.65 0.74
n=21
Table 7 - Thinner Event study: Top VCs and Local Exits
-3Q -2Q -1Q 0Q 1Q 2Q 3Q
Coefficient 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.75 0.70 0.77 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.74
n=78
Table 8 - Lengthier Event study: Top VCs and Local Exits
-3Y -2Y -1Y 0Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Coefficient 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.37
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.87 0.84 0.93 0.90 0.95 0.87 0.90
n=21
Table 9 - Lengthier Event study: Top VCs and Size of Local Exits
-3Y -2Y -1Y 0Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Coefficient 0.84 1.28 1.38 4.68 8.27 10.09 13.64
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00













Table 10 - Thinner Event study: Entrepreneurs-investors and VC Deals
-3Q -2Q -1Q 0Q 1Q 2Q 3Q
Coefficient 235 246 252 263 269 273 264
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.53
n=76
Table 11 - Lengthier Event study: Entrepreneurs-investors and VC Deals
-3Y -2Y -1Y 0Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Coefficient 337 413 481 560 507 574 583
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.91 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.79 0.73 0.56
n=20
Table 12 - Thinner Event study: Entrepreneurs-investors and Top-VC Deals
-3Q -2Q -1Q 0Q 1Q 2Q 3Q
Coefficient 5.07 5.84 5.84 6.46 6.22 6.71 6.63
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.43 0.51 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.51 0.49
n=76
Table 13 - Lengthier Event study: Entrepreneurs-investors and Top VC Deals
-3Y -2Y -1Y 0Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Coefficient 6.82 7.07 8.80 10.42 10.44 11.81 12.92
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.89 0.86 0.92 0.96 0.85 0.78 0.69
n=20
Table 14 - Thinner Event study: Entrepreneurs-investors and Local Exits
-3Q -2Q -1Q 0Q 1Q 2Q 3Q
Coefficient 1.10 1.17 1.42 1.37 1.41 1.36 1.30
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.36 0.36 0.49 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.32
n=73
Table 15 - Lengthier Event study: Entrepreneurs-investors and Local Exits
-3Y -2Y -1Y 0Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Coefficient 1.19 1.79 2.05 2.50 2.86 3.31 3.99
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.95 0.89 0.88 0.72
n=20
Table 16 - Lengthier Event study: Entrepreneurs-investors and Local Exits Size
-3Y -2Y -1Y 0Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Coefficient 14.26 21.78 29.18 60.42 87.05 86.84 100.32
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
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